For the last fifteen years, there has been widespread speculation about the existence of a second Cold War that has emerged either with the US and Russia or between the US and China (this article will focus on the latter). Additionally, that this emergence of attitude expresses a sense of inevitability to what will happen between either series of superpower competition.
I would argue that this ‘inevitability’ is incorrect and presents an inaccurate view of how we understand these chaotic times. Firstly, this can be understood that there is current structural system theory that both superpowers believe that they are in an ‘inevitable rivalry’. This idea itself is popular with leading neorealists like Mearsheimer. In short Neorealists believe that states behave according to the international structure they are in. Currently, they would argue does that exist within the early stages of this rivalry. This inevitable rivalry mirrors that of the US and the USSR during the early stages of the Cold War (1946-1950).
During the early years of the first Cold War, we witnessed a similar demonstration of mistrust being shown between Kennan (1946) and Novikov (1946) Zhdanov (1947) telegrams. In all the letters, an absence of political confidence was expressed by both sides. For Kennan, this was shown in that “at the bottom of the Kremlin’s view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”. It is from this that Kennan (1946) argued that it was impossible for the US and the USSR to reconcile their differences. While similarly for Novikov, “US foreign policy has been characterized in the post-war period by a desire for world domination”. In addition, for Zhdanov, “America’s aspirations to world supremacy encounter an obstacle in the USSR, the stronghold of anti-imperialist and anti-fascist policy, and its growing international influence”.
What this showed between both power’s policymaking elite, during the early stages of the Cold War, that there was a belief that long lasting peace was unattainable. This reflected a larger systemic belief that tensions between the two opposing powers were harboured in a lack of trust which thus led to the bipolar rivalry to emerge. Subsequently, this inevitable rivalry explains the initial mindset for both states. While, the USSR could never compete with the economic output of the US, however as China has risen economically, it has sought to compete against the US, in recent years.
As such, with an economically and geopolitically rising China and a potentially declining US, a neorealist examination becomes apparent. For academics like Mearsheimer, Allison and Yao having argued that this will mean they are mostly likely destined for conflict, presenting a sense of inevitability.
This structural belief that the US and China will clash, has been documented prior than before the idea of a Second Cold War entered widespread public knowledge. This has been shown with Qiao and Wang (senior military figures within China) and Wang (senior Politburo member and core political theorist since the Jiang Administration) (both originally published in the 1990’s). For China this mirrors the Second Cold War dynamics being demonstrated, with successive Chinese Leadership believing that they will eventually clash with the US, especially during its decline. Secondly, we see this mirror, with Wang being considered “China’s Kissinger”, being one of many brainchildren of Chinese policy by Lyons, due to his political and historical theories towards US-Chinese relations.
In short, what this demonstrates is that since 2007, both the US and arguably China have mirrored the start of the early Cold War period. This has been regarding the belief that they will eventually clash, presenting this inevitable rivalry mentality to emerge once more.
However, is a Second Cold War inevitable? Arguably, no; the problem would suggest being the unit-level factor of the mentality itself not the structural conditions that these superpowers find themselves in. Subsequently, it becomes a matter of thought, simply put ‘if one believes he is in a fight then we should not be surprised if he throws the first punch’. What this would ultimately mean is that instead of seeing a structural return in Cold War Mindset conditions, we are merely returning to ascribing about our present factors through an old and possibly outdated lens. This itself comes as recent polling data has shown that “the share of Chinese adults who believe the United States and China are in a cold war has reached a tracking high (28%)”, while similarly it reached a mere 20% in the US. What this might show is a direct disconnect between both nations’ general publics and their policymaking elite.
In conclusion, one could make the argument that if we want to avoid entering a second Cold War then we could first change how we think how we approach such matters. This is especially relevant regarding the idea that of superpower conflict and competition in being inevitable, between nations like the US and China and their respective elites.
Mr. Nathan Wilson is a Research Fellow at Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies at the Forum for Global Studies, New Delhi. Nathan Wilson is a graduate of University of Glasgow in Global Security.