I was recently approach by a group of UK researchers about what the nation’s foreign policy (specifically its Indo-Pacific policies) should look like, under the start of Liz Truss’s tenure ship as Prime Minister. This was a part of wider policy paper, which sought to examine a ‘New Conservatism’ within the UK. Consequently, in the following article is an expansion of my thoughts towards how the UK could improve its foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific. Since the introduction of 2019’s Integrated Review, the United Kingdom has aimed at reinventing itself on the world’s stage post-Brexit. One of the biggest changes from the introduction of this policy change was the nation’s ‘tilt’ towards the Indo-Pacific. In the three years after the announcement of this tilt or pivot for many, very little has directly changed except for presenting a more vocal position about China and attempting to form deeper relations with other Indo-Pacific nations like Japan and Singapore.
As such, for Liz Truss as new UK Prime Minister, there are four core pieces of policy that the UK could pursue which would build upon 2019’s Integrated Review. Subsequently, I would argue that for the UK to be taken more seriously within Indo-Pacific, the country should provide a deeper and more consistent role that matches to intensity played for aligned nations like Australia and Japan. What this would help create is a more dynamic and thorough position being held by the UK going forward. Firstly, the UK could officially join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), as a QUAD Plus nation, alongside New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam. This would act as a supporting role within this loose alliance of major Indo-Pacific countries. What this would assist is the both the UK’s wider goal of curtailing a more assertive China within the region, while simultaneously boosting its diplomatic and strategic connections abroad. In addition, domestically this would hold importance because it would interlink with the 2019’s Integrated Review’s sister document (Defence in a Competitive Age) concerning the modernization of the UK Armed Forces, by further allowing the UK to hold supplementary military exercises within other QUAD nations.
A second key policy that the UK could pursue is that of developing deeper diplomatic and economic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This follows that in August 2021, the UK officially became a Dialogue Partner with ASEAN and have continued to proceed with forming the ASEAN-UK Dialogue Partnership (2022-2026). Consequently, this would be enhanced with the UK Government becoming more focused on prioritising ASEAN’s various Summits, throughout the year. What this would allow for, is the UK to develop a more extensive relationship with not just these nations but the core intergovernmental organisation that binds them together too. The results of this would focus on a more comprehensive relationship to be established between the UK and ASEAN directly. After this, it would be ideal for the UK to seek a far-reaching Free-Trade agreement between both parties. This would help cement the UK’s role within the Indo-Pacific and its tilt going forward. Alongside this signing of security agreements with ASEAN will also be of importance too. In summary, as Southeast Asia continues to grow in economic and political importance in the following decades, as too should the weight of the UK’s emphasis on the region at and its paramount intergovernmental organization.
A third core point is that of potentially opening a secondary naval base in the Indo-Pacific, with it most likely being in Southeast Asia. As previously mentioned, as these nations continue to grow in importance (in terms of economy and diplomacy) as too will the securitization of certain aspects of them will also occur. One of the best ways that the UK could place another overseas base in the eastern portion of Southeast Asia, with its first in Singapore (covering the Western half of the region). Although the UK does have “seven ‘permanent points of presence’ in the Indian Ocean (Bahrain, Oman, Kenya, Brunei, Singapore, Diego Garcia and Qatar)”, its Army base in Brunei is the only one in the Far East, while Singapore is its only Naval support base. The potential for a secondary base could bring additionally rewards for the UK and its allied nations, in tackling the continuing security issues being faced.
Alongside this, it has been no secret that for over the last twenty years the region has struggled with terrorism and piracy (specifically across the Malay Archipelago). It is reasonable to assume that at the minimum piracy across the region will increase in future years, especially around the South China Sea, Sulu Sea, and Celebes Sea. Such areas too will become increasingly important strategically and to the economies of these nations. These have been historically areas that have suffered in recent decades and have played a substantial role in facilitating extremism and piracy across the region. In addition, with Indonesia moving its capital from Jakarta to Kalimantan, and the surrounding nations continuing to grow rapidly and become more export led as too will the opportunities to commit piracy and interfere with global supply chains. As such, a secondary UK Navy base would allow for British overseas interests to be better secured and to provide additional help to the effected Southeast Asian nations. The results of such actions will in turn help the UK’s plans at becoming more involved in the Indo-Pacific and continuing to establish good relations with its nations.
A final core policy that should be pursued is that of the formation of a direct Indian-UK plan, this is to maximize the opportunities that the UK could get from the country going forward. This would entail several different things: Firstly, a full comprehensive Free-Trade Agreement, this would have to mean that both sides give up several different barriers defining there existing relationship. Secondly, a direct focus on establishing more substantial security relations. This would itself link into previous point regarding the QUAD and the UK playing a more supportive role for Indo-Pacific powers. The core reason for both points is that as India is a rising regional power and global player, it will only further hold a major say over global trade and control over the Indian Ocean. Subsequently, this development would help both nations in playing off each other’s respective strengths in the subsequent decades. Additionally, India is on track to overtake China as the most populace nation on the planet and become a major manufacturing hub in the next few years.
In conclusion, if the UK government under Liz Truss wants to go further and surpass Boris Johnson, these are just a few actions that could be undertaken. I would argue that pursuing such policies could be an ideal way to better achieve and exceed those goals set out in 2019 going forward. Although, presently it remains unclear if Liz Truss’s tenure as Prime Minister will herald any real dramatic change regarding the UK’s current Indo-Pacific strategies.