In a recent Foreign Policy article by C. Raja Mohan, it was claimed that if you take “a closer look, and you will find the ideology of nonalignment was dead long ago”. This has been for one core reason, which was of economic pragmatism with global south (GS) nations. The logic for this change was that Soviet styled economics ultimately failed and would not provide a viable future for nations following similar paths. This has been best shown with nations prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union adopting more capitalistic economic models like in Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew and China with Deng Xiaoping’s Nanxun Way. It is worth noting that Mohan has made rather astute points about the problems that exist within Western policymaking circles and the level of entitlement that Western countries hold over GS nations. Mohan is correct about the West needing to earn support from these states rather than expect them to fall in line with them. This expectation allowed the West to fall short when anticipating that other nations would follow in placing sanctions upon Russia post-Ukraine invasion earlier this year. However, Mohan falls short in addressing the structural realism that embodies most current nonalignment that occurs. As a result, I would argue that nonalignment although not as obvious, still exists but instead has merely morphed into another realm, while being de facto the same. This change is more interlinked into a general unwillingness to get involved in great power competition and continue to work into only the aspects of which GS nations want to be involved in.
Western perspectives on this subject have often been hallmarked as the GS being ‘unwilling to choose’, they in its place like to ‘act above such matters and seek to remain ambiguous’, nevertheless this idea remains outdated. For the majority, of GS nations this is not an unwillingness but rather strategically seeking to remain uninvolved in issues that do not directly matter to them. The results of these messages and actions demonstrates a level of strategic ambiguity being conducted collectively amongst GS nations. A notable example of this has been shown with those Southeast Asian nations in the form of ASEAN. If we take the factor that throughout the Cold War, Southeast Asia has the backyard for various major foreign policy events. These range from the Vietnam War, to the Indonesian Politicide of the 1960’s and even the creation of ASEAN itself as a counter to the spread of Communism throughout the region in 1967. Yet, despite this in the Post-Cold War years ASEAN rose to embody non-alignment to a tee. The ASEAN Way, which makes up the core of how ASEAN own political and security structures operate are themselves based on non-interference, consensus building and respect independence and sovereignty. This has been outlined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 and is still enforced today. More importantly, this exists not just within itself but how it influences how these nations handle the external world. What this shows is that de facto nonalignment still alive within a lot of GS nations. This is what helps explain a reluctance for ASEAN nations to pick sides regarding the ongoing Russo-Ukraine conflict, thus continuing nonalignment.
A secondary point that could happen is that of a blurring of the lines between alignment and nonalignment. This can be thought of as possible entering a phrase where specifically ASEAN nations might economically align with China (Foreign Direct Investment and the Belt and Road Initiative), while military and security-wise aligning with the US (South China Sea). This being that some nations are seeking to be more strategic to what directly benefits them and yet ambiguous to where their loyalties lay. What this shows is that on a certain level the lines of nonalignment are becoming increasingly blurred on a state-by-state basis but strategically we can be seeing the emergence of a collective ambiguous process being taken. This in of itself, in still in line with the original ideas enshrined within tenets of nonalignment and especially the Havana Declaration of 1979. These outlined as being the maintenance of “national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries”. The reason for this, is because it directly suits the immediate needs for these nations, as there is very little direct reason for why nations like Paraguay or Cambodia would feel the need to weigh into Western-Russian Geopolitics. Nonetheless, it continues to serve of no benefit to pick a side in major divisive issues, while seeking to maximise GS nations opportunities and connections abroad.
In conclusion, one might begin to wonder what this might mean going forward for various GS nations, for that it would be too soon to say explicitly. But what is observable is that nonalignment is at least some degree is going to stay for most of the world’s nations going forward.